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Fighting Poverty with Faith: Reflections on
Ten Years of Charitable Choice
Michele Estrin Gilman"
In 1996, welfare reform legislation spurred heated debates over tough
new work requirements for welfare recipients and lifetime limits on welfare
benefits. I Advocates sought to eliminate dependency on government;
opponents feared widespread impoverishment of women and children. 2 In
the midst of the uproar, then-Senator John Ashcroft quietly inserted a
provision into the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRA) that garnered scant attention at that time but
transformed the delivery of welfare services in this country and radically
redefined the relationship between church and state. 3 This provision,
commonly known as charitable choice, permits government funding of
religious organizations, including churches, synagogues, and mosques, to
deliver welfare-related services. 4 Prior to welfare reform, houses of worship
and other sectarian organizations were not eligible to receive government
funds to deliver social services. 5 Instead, religious organizations that wanted
to contract with government had to create secular affiliates and keep
religious content out of their government-funded programs. 6 These steps are
no longer necessary. Charitable choice was the first major governmental
lnitiative for direct funding of churches, and thus, it quickly became a
lightning rod for dissension. The debate intensified with the election of
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\. See GWENDOLYN MINK & ALICE O'CONNOR, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND POVERTY 813-15 (Gwendolyn Mink ed., 2004).
2.

Id.

3. See AMY E. BLACK ET AL., OF LITTLE FAITH: THE POLITICS OF GEORGE W. BUSH'S FAITH
BASED INITIATIVE 22-32 (2004).
4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2 \05,2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)).

5. See Michele Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice" and the Accountability Challenge:
Reconciling the NeedJor Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REv.
799,811 (2002).

6.

Id.
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President George W. Bush, who made expanding and enforcing charitable
choice a centerpiece of his "compassionate conservatism" domestic agenda. 7
The controversy over charitable choice does not split along party,
religious, or partisan lines. Religion plays a central and complex role in
American society, and as a result, reactions to charitable choice splinter
among and within the many constituencies impacted by the law. 8 Supporters
believe that religion should playa greater role within civil society and that
religious groups have been discriminated against in government contracting
programs. 9 Moreover, charitable choice advocates contend that a spiritual
approach is more effective than a secular one in solving social problems. 10
As then-Governor Bush stated, "Government can do certain things very
well, but it cannot put hope in our hearts or a sense of purpose in our lives.
That requires churches and synagogues and mosques and charities.,,11
By contrast, many religious leaders fear that accepting government
money would lead to increased bureaucratization of churches, church
dependence on government funding, and government interference with
religious practices. 12 In short, these critics fear that "government shekels"
come with "government shackles.,,13 Some conservative religious leaders
object to charitable choice because they do not want government money
flowing to "objectionable" religious groups, such as Scientology and the
Nation of Islam.14 On the left, liberal critics charge that charitable choice
permits federally subsidized employment discrimination on the basis of

7. See Mary Segers, President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative, in FAITH-BASED INlTlATIVES
AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 1,5 (10 Renee Formicola et
al. eds., 2003) (hereinafter FAITH-BASED INlTlATlVES).
8. Id. at 3. Even within denominations, religious leaders are split on their support for the
concept of charitable choice. Id. It is opposed by most mainline Protestants as well as most reform
and conservative Jewish groups. Id. It is supported by most evangelical Protestants and Orthodox
Jewish groups, while the U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference supports it with reservations. Id.
African-American denominations are split over the wisdom of charitable choice. Id.
9. The arguments on both sides of the charitable choice issue are summarized in BLACK ET
AL., supra note 3, at 65-73 and FAITH-BASED INlTlATlVES, supra note 7, at 15-18, 161-81.

10. See, e.g., Stanley Carlson-Thies, Faith Based Institutions Cooperating with Public
Welfare: The Promise of the Charitable Choice Provision, in WELFARE REFORM AND FAITH BASED
ORGANIZATIONS 29, 30 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999).
II.

See FAITH-BASED INlTlATlVES, supra note 7, at 31.

12. See, e.g., David Saperstein, Appropriate and Inappropriate Use of Religion, in SACRED
PLACES, CIVIC PURPOSES 297, 302--{)3 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & Ming Hsu Chen eds., 2001).
13. See Jeffrey Polet & David K. Ryden, Past, Present, Future: Final Reflections on FaithBased Programs, in SANCTIONING RELIGION? POLITICS, LAW, AND FAITH-BASED PUBLIC SERVICES
177, 181 (David K. Ryden & Jeffrey Polet eds., 2005) ("Others worry more about the religious
entities themselves, and what might happen if they avail themselves of public dollars.").

14. See, e.g., ARTHUR E. FARNSLEY II, RISING EXPECTATIONS: URBAN CONGREGATIONS,
WELFARE REFORM, AND CIVIC LIFE 88 (2002) (quoting Reverend Jerry Falwell's concerns about
funding Moslem organizations); Segers, supra note 7, at I (listing similar examples).
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religion, because charitable choice exempts religious contractors from
certain anti-discrimination employment laws. ls Liberal opponents also worry
about religious coercion of welfare beneficiaries, as well as the quickly
dissolving boundaries between church and state. 16 Further, critics worry that
charitable choice is a step towards pushing the entire responsibility for
alleviating poverty to the private sector, and they point to decreasing
government funding for public benefits programs during the Bush
Administration. 17
In 1996, these arguments were mostly speculative. We now have ten
years of experience with charitable choice to begin to assess its impact and
to consider its future role. One thing is certain: charitable choice is here to
stay. In 2005, the White House reported that federal agencies awarded over
$2.15 billion to faith-based organizations, accounting for 10.9% of the total
funding distributed through 158 programs and seven federal agencies. 18
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), which administers many welfarerelated programs, increased its awards to faith-based organizations by 88%
between 2002 and 2004. 19 The definition of "faith-based organizations" is
muddled, because these organizations vary tremendously in how much
emphasis they place on faith and in the sort of ties they may have with
religion in tenns of funding, staffing, governance, and adherence to the
nonns of religious bodies. 2o While congregations are a subset of faith-based
organizations, they are conceptually different because their primary mission

15.

42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000).

16.

See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 65-73; FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at

15-18,161-81.

17.

See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 65-73; FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at

15-18,161-81.

18. See Claire Hughes, White House Report: Federal Grants to FBOs Up in 2005,
ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION AND SOC. POL'y (2006), http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org!
news/article.cfm?id=3967.
19.

[d.

20. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, SAVING AMERICA? FAITH-BASED SERVICES AND THE FUTURE
OF CIVIL SOCIETY 138-49 (2004); see also FREDRICA D. KRAMER ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE,
FEDERAL POLICY ON THE GROUND: FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS DELIVERING SOCIAL SERVICES
67 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311197_ DP05-0I.pdf. The article
notes:
The term encompasses a wide variety of organizations, including large and small,
affiliates and independents, community-based and congregation-based, and providers
of secular and faith-infused services. Given this breadth, the term has limited meaning
for analytic purposes. It is sufficiently politically charged that organizations may label
themselves as faith-based in the belief that doing so will help get them money, or
disavow the label for fear that accepting it would buy into administration initiatives
they oppose.
[d.
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is not social service. 21 Nevertheless, it is safe to say that within this broad
definitional umbrella, religious groups now deliver a wide array of
government-funded, welfare-related services, including job trammg,
employment placement, emergency housing, parenting classes, life skills
training, substance abuse treatment, teen abstinence counseling, and child
care. 22 Moreover, the Deficit Reduction Act of2005, which reauthorized the
1996 welfare reform statute, provides $100 million per year for five years
for healthy marriage promotion efforts, and $50 million per year over five
years for responsible fatherhood programs. 23 Government agencies are
actively recruiting religious groups as grantees for these funds. 24
Yet despite the billions of dollars flowing to religious organizations to
deliver human services, there has been little scrutiny of whether charitable
choice is effective in fighting poverty.25 This article discusses the benefits
and limitations of charitable choice. To begin with, charitable choice
requires a constitutional balance too precarious for many religious groups to
maintain. 26 Numerous lawsuits are challenging overtly religious programs,
usually delivered by white, evangelical Christian religious groups, which
coerce participants into following the grantee organization's religious
beliefs. 27 Religious content is spilling over into welfare programs partly
because there are few accountability mechanisms in place to ensure that
religious grantees respect constitutional boundaries or deliver on contractual
obligations. 28 In addition, the government is spending millions of dollars to
convince churches to apply for charitable choice grants, yet most
congregations lack the institutional capacity to deliver many welfare-related
services, which require professional skills and sophisticated contract and

21. See WUTHNOW, supra note 20, at 149; see also id. at 171 ("The comparison between
faith-based organizations and congregations becomes especially important for making broader
observations about the role of religion in providing social services.").
22. The White House provides an annual catalogue of available grant opportunities for
religious organizations. See Federal Funds for Organizations That Help Those In Need (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/governmentlfbcilgrants-catalog-05-2006.pdf (listing more
than 170 programs with grant opportunities).
23.

Deficit Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7103 (2005).

24. See ANNE FARRIS, RICHARD P. NATHAN & DAVID J. WRIGHT, THE ROUNDTABLE ON
RELIGION AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY, THE EXPANDING ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY: GEORGE
W. BUSH AND THE FAITH BASED INITIATIVE 14-20 (August 2004), http://www.religionandsocial
policy.orgidocs/policy/FB_Administrative_Presidency_Report_10_08_04.pdf.
25.

See infra Part ILA (discussing the difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of charitable

choice).

26.

See infra Part LB.

27.

See infra Part II.A.

28.

ld.
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program management. 29 Finally, there is scant empirical evidence that a
spiritual approach is superior to a secular one in delivering welfare services,
suggesting that the constitutional risks are simply not worth taking. 3o Despite
the defects underlying current charitable choice programs, one insight of
civil society proponents remains true--congregations have great reserves of
social capital that can be successfully channeled in the fight against
poverty.31 Particularly in low-income communities, churches play an
instrumental role in connecting people to one another, to other organizations,
and to available social services.
Thus, the challenge is getting government to partner productively with
churches, while avoiding the dangers inherent in charitable choice. This
article argues that these goals can be achieved. Part I of the article describes
the charitable choice statute, the governing constitutional framework, and
the precarious balance between religiosity and neutrality that underlies
charitable choice. Part II analyzes the flaws of charitable choice as an antipoverty mechanism, concluding that the constitutional dangers of charitable
choice far outweigh the benefits of current faith-based contracting. Part III
uses African-American churches as a model to show how congregations
generate social capital, which consists of trust relationships that arise
between individuals involved in social networks. Part IV proposes
alternative ways for government to partner with religious organizations that
avoid the shortcomings associated with charitable choice, while seizing upon
the substantial social capital offered by these groups. In brief, this Part
suggests that churches are ill-suited for delivering welfare counseling
services that are transformative in nature, but ideally suited to deliver
discrete, sustenance-based services as well as to serve as links between the
needy and other community groups and governmental agencies.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF CHARITABLE CHOICE

Charitable choice had its genesis in a group of conservative scholars,
policymakers, and politicians who banded together in the early 1990s with
the goal of bringing religion more overtly into the public square. 32 For these
actIvlsts, government aid is bureaucratic, impersonal, and breeds
dependency.33 By contrast, churches can provide spiritual solace and moral

29.

See infra Part II.B.

30.

See infra Part II.A.

31.

See ;,ifra Part III.

See Jo Renee Fonnicola, The Good in the Faith-Based Initiative. in FAITH-BASED
supra note 7, at 28-45; BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 46-48 (describing the influence
of the Center for Public Justice and its goals of "finding a more welcome place for Christian groups
and ideas in the public square").
32.

INITIATIVES,

33.

Id. at 27 ("Most ofthese thinkers believed that government alone could not provide-and
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guidance to poor individuals that will lift them out of poverty.34 As Texas
Governor, George W. Bush was one of the first political leaders to put the
ideas of these conservative, religious thinkers into practice. 35 He established
a state policy of partnering with religious groups to deliver social services. 36
For President Bush, charitable choice has both personal and political
resonance. On a personal level, charitable choice appeals to Bush because of
his own religious conversion, which helped him overcome personal
problems. 37 As a political matter, charitable choice allows Bush to appeal
not only to his electoral base of religious conservatives and evangelicals, but
also to court potential supporters among urban Latinos and African
Americans, who tend to vote Democratic while also being strongly
religious. 38 President Bush has aggressively and effectively expanded
charitable choice. This Part sets forth the parameters and scope of charitable
choice and examines its legality.
A. Charitable Choice Legislation

The PRA created the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (T ANF)
block grant that states administer to qualifying needy families. 39 The PRA's
stated purposes are to reduce welfare dependency and out-of-wedlock births
and to encourage the formation of two-parent families. 4o The PRA gives the
states considerable flexibility to create their own welfare programs with their
TANF funds as long as they meet these objectives. In addition, states have
the option of further devolving welfare operations to the county and city
level, and to private organizations if they choose. Under the charitable
choice provision, states can further opt to provide welfare services through
contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations, or to provide
beneficiaries with vouchers that are redeemable with such private
organizations. 41 Since the PRA, charitable choice provisions have been

was not providing-effective welfare."}.
34. Id. at 36 (quoting Indianapolis mayor Stephen Goldmith, who wrote that "church based
efforts provide needy individuals with a source of strength and the moral impetus for personal
change that government simply cannot").
35.

See id. at 26.

36.

Id.

37.

See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 88; FARRIS ET AL.,supra note 24, at 3.

38.

See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 87-89.

39. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). The TANF program replaced the prior welfare system, known as
Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
40.

Id.

4 I.

Id. § 604a.
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included in a variety of other social service statutes. 42 Moreover, President
Bush has expanded charitable choice through the entire human services
bureaucracy by utilizing executive orders. 43
The charitable choice legislation in the PRA was carefully crafted with
input from several lawyers and academics to ease First Amendment churchstate separation concerns while simultaneously preserving the religious
character of the grantees. 44 Religious organizations receiving charitable
choice funds have several rights under the statute. To begin with,
governmental entities cannot discriminate against religious organizations in
awarding contracts,45 nor can they interfere with the religious organization's
"control over the definition, development, practice, and expression of its
religious beliefs."46 In addition, religious organizations receiving charitable
choice funds need not alter their internal governance structures or remove
religious art, icons, or other symbols from their premises. 47 Finally, religious
organizations are exempt from Title VII's nondiscrimination in employment
requirements. 48
Beneficiaries also have defined rights. Most importantly, charitable
choice funds cannot be used for proselytizing or worship.49 In addition,
states must provide nonsectarian alternatives for beneficiaries who object to
the religious character of their provider;50 the TANF regulations that
implement the PRA require that service providers give notice to
beneficiaries informing them of this right. Under the statute, religious
organizations cannot discriminate against beneficiaries on the basis of
religion or religious beliefs. 51 With regard to accountability, the statute
provides that religious organizations are subject to the same regulations as
other contractors "to account in accord with generally accepted auditing
42. See Community Services Block Grant Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. \05-285 (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 9920 (2003»; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. \06-3\0 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 290kk-l (2003»; Community Renewal Tax Relief Act
of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-14).
43.

See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.

44. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, I \0 Stat. 2105, § 104(b) (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §
604a). ("The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract with religious organizations, or to
allow religious organizations to accept certificates on the same basis as any other nongovernmental
provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing
the religious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program.").
45.

Jd. § 104(c).

46.

Jd. § 104(d)(I).

47.

Jd. § 104(d)(2).

48.

Jd. § 104(f).

49.

Jd. § 104(j).

50.

110 Stat. 2105, § 104(e)(I).

51.

Jd. § 104(g).
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principles for the use of such funds," although the organization can
segregate federal funds into separate accounts and limit any audit to those
accounts. 52 Finally, the statute provides that any party seeking to enforce its
rights may file a civil suit for injunctive relief in state court. 53
The scope and scale of charitable choice have expanded dramatically
since the PRA was enacted. Although President Clinton did little to
implement charitable choice, the terrain changed dramatically when
President Bush took office in 2001. 54 President Bush sought not only to
enforce the charitable choice provisions in the PRA, but also to expand
charitable choice across the entire human services bureaucracy. 55 Within
weeks of taking office, he announced the formation of the high-profile
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
("WHOFBCI") as well as satellite offices in five Cabinet-level agencies. 56
By executive order, he directed these offices to identify and remove
regulatory barriers that discouraged federal human services contracting with
faith-based groups, declaring that that government should provide a "level
playing field" between religious and secular grant applicants. 57 The White
House also issued a report contending that religious organizations were
discriminated against in the contracting process. 58
President Bush has failed repeatedly at getting Congress to pass his
expansion of charitable choice into law because opponents, having learned
their lesson in 1996, have effectively portrayed the proposed bills as
permitting federally funded religious discrimination in employment. 59
Nevertheless, the President has used the prerogatives of his office, including
a series of executive orders, to make an end-run around Congress. 60
Moreover, WHOFBCI and the satellite offices, which have now grown to
cover eleven agencies, aggressively promote charitable choice across the
country by conducting outreach sessions, conferences, and workshops to

52.

ld. § 104(h).

53.

ld. § 104(i).

54.

See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 62.

55.

See generally FARRIS ET AL., supra note 24.

56. Exec. Order No. 13, 199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001); see also BLACK ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 202.
57.

Exec. Order No. 13, 199.

58. WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD:
BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION BY FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN FEDERAL
SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS (Aug. 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/#/newslreleases/200l/08/
2001 081 6-3-report.pdf.
59.

See Segers, supra note 7, at 8-11.

60. See Michele Estrin Gilman, If At First You Don't Succeed. Sign an Executive Order:
President Bush and the Expansion a/Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming
2007).
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educate state officials and religious organizations about available grants and
how to apply for them. 61 Grant announcements at all levels of government
now explicitly state that faith-based groups are not only eligible to compete
for federal grants, but also that they are especially encouraged to apply.62 As
noted earlier, these executive branch efforts are yielding results-billions of
dollars are being funneled toward religious organizations to deliver human
services. 63
Although a future president could rescind President Bush's executive
orders, ignore the PRA' s charitable choice provisions, and shut down the
WHOFBCI, this is unlikely to happen regardless of which party wins office
in 2008. Likely candidates from both political parties have been touting the
benefits of religious influence in public life.64 In the current political climate,
no candidate or politician wants to look anti-religion, and thus, dismantling a
large component of the federal bureaucracy would be a difficult political
sell. In short, charitable choice is now a permanent fixture of the human
services bureaucracy.
B. The Constitutional Context
The drafters of charitable choice aimed to create a law that would pass
constitutional muster under the U.S. Supreme Court's quickly changing
religion clause jurisprudence. 65 The drafters had to predict where the Court's
First Amendment currents would lead, but they also saw an opportunity to

61. See DAVE DONALDSON & STANLEY CARLSON-THIES, A REVOLUTION OF COMPASSION
73 (2003).
62. See Federal Funds for Organizations That Help Those in Need (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/governmentlfbcilgrants-catalog-05-2006.pdf (listing more than 150
programs with grant opportunities for faith-based organizations); see also FARRIS ET AL., supra note
24.
63. See WHOFBCI Accomplishments in 2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
governmentlfbcil2006_accomplishments.html ("Competitive Federal grants to faith-based
organizations (FBOs) increased for the third straight year in FY2005. More than $2.1 billion in
grants were awarded to religious organizations in FY2005 by seven federal agencies."); see also
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Urges More Money for Religious Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,2006, at
AI (stating in 2005, the President awarded over $2 billion in faith-based grants).
64. See, e.g., Anne E. Kornblut, Political Memo; For This Red Meat Crowd, Obama's '08
Choice Is Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,2006, at A21 (Sen. Barack Obama, a potential Democratic
candidate, "has earned a reputation for persuasive rhetoric about the role of religion in politics");
Raymond Hernandez, Hillary Clinton's Popularity Up in State, Even Among Republicans, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at BI (likely candidate and Democrat, Senator Hilary Clinton often makes
references to faith and prayer); Adam Nagoumey, McCain Emphasizing His Conservative Bona
Fides, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at I (describing Republican Senator John McCain's efforts to reach
out to Rev. Jerry Falwell in advance of a likely presidential run).
65. Law professor Carl Esbeck was integral in drafting the statute. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert
W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. I, 4 n.20 (2005)
(noting the role Prof. Esbeck played as an advisor to Senator Ashcroft, the sponsor of charitable
choice in the PRA); BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 45-49 (same).
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shape the course of the flow. The Supreme Court has not ruled on any aspect
of charitable choice, although cases are working through the system that
may eventually be reviewed. Certiorari has been granted on the complicated
issue of whether taxpayers have standing to challenge charitable choice
programs. 66 Most scholars agree that government funding of faith-based
providers is permissible under the First Amendment as interpreted by the
current Court,67 although some scholars object to the state of the law. 68 At
the same time, the lower federal courts are striking down specific charitable
choice programs for straying beyond permissible boundaries. 69 In short,
charitable choice may be constitutional on its face but is far more
problematic as applied. 7o As a result, numerous charitable choice programs
have been subject to litigation,71 and we can expect continued litigation as
courts define the parameters of permissible charitable choice programs.
Under the First Amendment's religion clauses, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."n Charitable choice is usually contested on Establishment Clause
grounds. Opponents of charitable choice view it as an unlawful
establishment of religion because government is not only funding religious
organizations but also giving its imprimatur to religion as a solution for
social problems. 73 This risks religious coercion of welfare recipients, as well

66.

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), cert.

granted, 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
67. See e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 65 ("Changes in the law of the religion clauses have
rendered it constitutionally plausible, but hardly unassailable.").
68. See Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 33, 45-46 (2000); Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choice, in
WELFARE REFORM & F AITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, at 219-{;5.
69. See infra cases discussed in Part I.C, as well as the comprehensive listing of charitable
choice litigation, including pending cases, at The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy,
Legal Updates, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legaVlega_updates.cfm (last visited Feb. 21,
2007).
70. There are a variety of other constitutional issues raised by charitable choice, including
the constitutionality of the exemption from employment discrimination laws for charitable choice
grantees. See generally Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding, and
Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. I (2002); Melissa McClellan, Faith and

Federalism: Do Charitable Choice Provisions Preempt State Nondiscrimination Employment
Laws?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv., 1437 (2004). On other constitutional issues, see generally, Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 65.
71. See Diana B. Henriques & Andrew Lehren, Religion for Captive Audiences, With
Taxpayers Footing the Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,2006, at All.
72.

U.s. CONST. AMEND. I.

73. See Paul Weber, The Bad in the Faith-Based Initiative, in FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES,
supra note 7, at 63, 92 (summarizing the First Amendment objections to charitable choice); David
Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L.
REv. 559, 561 (2002) ("The initiative is premised in significant part on the conviction that because
oftheir faith, religious providers are better than their secular counterparts at delivering certain social
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as the opportunity for government to prefer certain religious organizations
over others. 74 By contrast, supporters of charitable choice argue that keeping
churches out of government-contracting programs results in discrimination
against religion in violation of the Establishment Clause's emphasis on
neutrality.75 Under a neutrality model, "individuals and religious groups
[can] participate fully and equally with their fellow citizens in America's
public life, without being forced either to shed or disguise their religious
convictions or character.,,76 Although the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is convoluted and rapidly changing,77 there are clear signals as
to how the Court would evaluate charitable choice.
The starting point for the analysis is Bowen v. Kendrick, a case that predates charitable choice by eight years, in which the Court considered the
extent to which government aid can flow to religiously affiliated social
service providers. 78 In Bowen, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), a statute that made government
grants available to public and nonprofit private organizations, including
religious organizations, to counsel and educate teenagers about reproduction
and sexuality. 79 The challengers contended that grants to religious
organizations violated the Establishment Clause. 8o The Court ruled that the
AFLA was constitutional on its face, but that individual AFLA grants might
violate the Establishment Clause as applied. 81 The Court's opinion largely
services. ").

74.

See Weber, supra note 73, at 65-67 (discussing coercion and discrimination objections).

75. See. e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Neutral Treatment of Religion and Faith-Based Social
Service Providers: Charitable Choice and Its Critics, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 68, at 180-82. In addition, some prominent charitable choice
supporters contend that religious organizations that participate in charitable choice should be free
from regulatory burdens that apply to secular grantees, arguing that the First Amendment permits, or
even mandates, such exemptions to avoid government interference with religion. See Carl H.
Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service
Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1,23-27 (1997). This viewpoint is not consistent with current law. See
Gilman, supra note 5, at 871-81 (explaining that religious organizations are subject to neutral laws
of general applicability). Also, contrary to the claims of some charitable choice supporters, it is clear
that governments are not required to adopt charitable choice, i.e. to open up social service
contracting to religious organizations. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that
the State of Washington did not have to provide college scholarships to students pursuing devotional
degrees).
76.

Esbeck, supra note 75, at 21.

77. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 804 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) ("[Olur
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while nevertheless retaining
anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle.").
78.

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988).

79.

Id. at 593-96.

80.

!d. at 596-97.

81. The Court applied the three-part purpose-effect-entanglement test for analyzing
Establishment Clause challenges set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which has
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hinged on its conclusion that as long as funds were not going towards
"pervasively sectarian" organizations, there was no risk of government
advancing, inhibiting, or excessively entangling itself with religion. 82 At that
time, the ban on direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions had a long
pedigree in cases involving aid to parochial schools. 83 Although the AFLA
survived facial attack, the Court remanded the case back to the district court
to determine whether the AFLA was unconstitutional as applied; that is,
whether some AFLA aid was flowing to pervasively sectarian grantees
and/or whether the aid was used to fund specifically religious activities. 84
The Court indicated that either of these uses would be unconstitutiona1. 85
Bowen approved government funding of religious organizations to
combat social problems as long as the aid money finances only secular
activities and as long as religious organizations are not preferred over
secular groupS.86 Thus, Bowen embodies the Court's move away from
separationist rhetoric that had long dominated its religion-clause
jurisprudence toward a more neutral vision, under which both the secular
and sectarian are entitled to equal treatment by govemment. 8? However,
Bowen also takes a strong stance against the funding of "pervasively
sectarian" institutions. 88 The Court has vaguely defined "pervasively
sectarian" organizations as those in which the "secular activities cannot be
separated from sectarian ones.,,89 Parochial schools and houses of worship fit
squarely within this definition. 9o Charitable choice violates the pervasively
sectarian test because its very purpose is to involve churches, synagogues,
mosques, and the like in welfare delivery without requiring these
organizations to set up affiliated, nonsectarian nonprofits. Yet since Bowen,
the Court has moved away from the "pervasively sectarian" test, and
accordingly, a majority of the Court no longer considers the nature of the

since been modified under Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Under the Agostini analysis, the
Court first asks whether the statute has a secular purpose and then looks to the effect of the statute by
asking whether the government aid (I) results in government indoctrination; (2) defines its recipients
by reference to religion; or (3) creates an excessive entanglement. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34.
82.

Lemon,403 U.S. at 610-18.

83.

See Gilman, supra note 5, at 865 n.323.

84.

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,622-23 (1988).

85.

[d.

86.

[d. at 608, 616.

87. For a description of the Court's move toward a neutrality theory of the religion clauses,
see generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 57--60 (2002).
88.

[d. at 609-12.

89.

Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).

90.

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,621 (1988).
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organization receiving aid to be detenninative. 91 This'shift accords with the
goals of the drafters of charitable choice who felt that religious organizations
were being unfairly excluded from government programs. 92
The Court shed the pervasively sectarian concept in a series of cases
involving government aid to parochial schools; which, like charitable choice,
raise concerns about government indoctrination and entanglement. 93 Thus,
the education cases are likely predictors of how the Court would treat
charitable choice. The leading case in this area is Mitchell v. Helms, in
which the Court upheld a federal program that provided educational
equipment and materials, such as computers, software, and VCRs, to
economically disadvantaged public and private schools, including religious
schools. 94 The Justices articulated three sharply differing positions about the
aid program. A four vote plurality consisting of Justices Thomas, Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Kennedy, concluded that the Establishment Clause is not
violated as long as the aid lacks religious content and is distributed based on
neutral criteria. 95 For the plurality, the actual use of the aid or the character
of the recipient is irrelevant. 96 By contrast, the dissenting Justices, consisting
of Souter, Stevens, and Ginsberg, contended that any fonn of government
aid that could potentially be diverted towards religious activities violates the
Establishment Clause. 97
The controlling opinion, authored by concurring Justice O'Connor and
joined by Justice Breyer, falls between these two positions. 98 Whereas
Bowen focused on the religious character of the recipient as the touchstone
for satisfying the Establishment Clause, the Mitchell concurrence focuses
instead on how the aid is actually used by grantees. Justice O'Connor
reaffinned the rule set forth in prior direct-aid cases that government aid
cannot be used to advance or inhibit religion. 99 Thus, the government
violates the Establishment Clause when it endorses religion, that is, when a
"reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as

91.

See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (discussed infra Part II.C).

92. See Jeffrey Polet & David K. Ryden, Religion. the Constitution. and Charitable Choice,
in SANCTIONING RELIGION?, supra note 13, at 19.
93. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 65, at 21-26 (describing the shifts in the Court's
jurisprudence with regard to direct government financing of schools).
94.

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion).

95.

[d. at 826.

96.

[d. at 814-15, 820, 827.

97.

[d. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting).

98.

[d. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

99.

[d. at 844-45 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997».
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government support for the advancement of religion."loo Accordingly,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the government can provide religiously
neutral aid to parochial schools as long as the aid is distributed to both
secular and sectarian schools on a neutral basis and is not, in fact, diverted
for religious· purposes.· Moreover, O'Connor detennined that because
religious indoctrination with government funds is impennissible, the
government must have adequate safeguards for preventing the unlawful
diversion of funds for religious purposes. IOI For the concurrence, all of these
conditions were satisfied in Mitchell. lo2 Whereas Bowen focused on the
religious character of the recipient as the touchstone for satisfying the
Establishment Clause, Mitchell focuses instead on how the aid is actually
used by grantees.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court further stressed the concept of
neutrality and created a safe harbor for voucher programs, a fonn of indirect
government aid.103 Whereas direct government aid involves contracting
directly with a religious provider to deliver services, indirect aid involves
giving private individuals vouchers, which they may use at any provider that
accepts the vouchers. I04 In a 5-4 decision, the majority approved the
Cleveland school district's use of tuition vouchers for low-income
elementary school students to attend the private schools of their choice,
including religious schools. lOS The majority reasoned that the intervening
private choice of parents to use their vouchers to send their children to
parochial schools erased any state responsibility for religious
indoctrination. 106 Accordingly, indirect aid programs are pennissible if there
is independent choice by beneficiaries and government neutrality in
selecting participating schools. 107 This would seem to portend an explosion
of voucher programs in the social services field because it avoids the

100. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843. In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor explained that
unlawful endorsement occurs when the government sends "a message to non-adherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668,668 (\984). For a critique of the endorsement test, see Jesse Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its
Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499 (2002).

101.

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 858-62.

102.

Id. at 867.

103.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

See Cole, supra note 73, at 565 ("Contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence
draws a sharp line between direct government aid, which generally may not support religious
activity, and indirect aid routed through private individual choice, such as vouchers, which may
generally support religious activity without creating a constitutional problem unless the private
routing is a transparent fiction.").
104.

105.

Id. at 662-63.

106.

Id. at 650-52.

107.

Id.
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complicated questions about the appropriate uses of direct aid under
Mitchell. Yet voucher programs in low-income communities can be
problematic as a policy matter because beneficiaries may not be able to gain
information about available services or to evaluat~ services rendered. 108
Also, som~ jurisdictions cannot maintain a competitive market of service
providers from which to choose, making the notion of choice meaningless.
Regardless of the constitutional appeal of voucher programs, most welfarerelated programs are still structured as direct aid programs. This is because
social service providers need to maintain their capacity to respond to
fluctuating demand and cannot run on fee-for-service arrangements. 109
Under both Mitchell and Zelman, charitable choice's direct aid
provision would likely satisfy current constitutional standards because it
requires government nondiscrimination in selecting grantees, and the aid is
not permitted to be used for "sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization.,,11O Although Justice O'Connor is no longer on the Court,
the newest members, Justices Roberts and Alito, are expected to hold views
on the religion clauses that would support charitable choice. III Still, it
remains to be seen whether they would go as far as the plurality in Mitchell,
which concluded that as long as distributional criteria are neutral, and the
purposes of the program are secular, the actual use of government aid is
irrelevant. 112 In sum, at the current time, charitable choice appears to be
facially valid, but its application has run into constitutional problems.
C. Charitable Choice Litigation

Numerous lawsuits have been filed challenging direct aid programs on
the grounds that the government funds were used for religious activities. 113

108. See Jo ANNE SCHNEIDER, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND WELFARE REFORM: ORGANIZATIONS,
CONGREGATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 234 (2006) ("People of the rising educated and established
middle class have the skills to evaluate these options, but this is far less likely to be the case for
regular users of these systems."); Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling
After the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE LJ. 493, 535 (1999) ("Autonomous choice is in
jeopardy when the individual has no money, food, or housing and is offered these necessities on
conditions that she might quickly refuse under other circumstances.").
109.

See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 87, at 74.

110.

42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(j) (2000).

III. See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 749 n.106 (2006) ("[B]oth of them [Roberts and Alito] expressed views prior
to serving on the bench that contribute to the perception that they will join the other three
conservatives on most issues relating to church/state issues.").

112. See IRA Lupu & ROBERT TuTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2005: LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH BASED
ORGANIZATIONS 19-20 (2005), available at http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org/publications/
publication.cfm?id=67.
113.

See cases gathered at The Roundtable on Social and Religious Policy, Legal Updates,
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Under Mitchell, government aid provided on a neutral basis to secular and
sectarian organizations does not violate the Establishment Clause, yet actual
diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination does. Accordingly, as
discussed below, charitable choice programs tend to run into constitutional
trouble when they push overtly religious messages that could coerce
vulnerable populations, particularly prisoners and children. The overt
religious content in many of the challenged programs not only threatens the
free exercise rights of program beneficiaries, but also can amount to a
government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.
A major recent opinion comes from Iowa, where Americans United for
Separation of Church and State challenged the InnerChange Freedom
Initiative (InnerChange), a pre-release prison program at the Newton
Correctional Facility designed to rehabilitate inmates and reduce
recidivism. I 14 After a lengthy trial, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa held that the program was unlawful, and the court
not only enjoined the program, but also ordered that InnerChange repay the
state of Iowa over $1.5 million in spent funds. 115 The court found that
program participants were required to spend hours each day engaging in
Bible study, as well as to attend daily religious devotional practice, worship
services, and weekly revivals. 116 In addition, InnerChange taught inmates
that criminal behavior is a sin, which can only be remedied "through a
miraculous delivery by God-specifically, God in ChriSt.,,117 The court
found further that the religious nature of the program precluded nonEvangelical Christian inmates from participating. 118 The Court stated, "The
overtly religious atmosphere of the InnerChange program is not simply an
overlay or a secondary effect of the program-it is the program.,,119 Thus,
"For all practical purposes, the state has literally established an Evangelical
Christian congregation within the walls of one of its penal institutions,
giving the leaders of that congregation, i.e., InnerChange employees,
authority to control the spiritual, emotional, and physical lives of hundreds
of Iowa inmates.,,120 These actions constituted "severe" violations of the
Establishment Clause, resulting in unlawful promotion of religion,

http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legaLupdates.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
114. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries,
432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
115.

Id. at 941.

116.

Id. at 901-03.

117.

Id. at 875.

118.

!d. at 898-99.

119.

Id. at 922.

120.

Americans United/or Separation a/Church and State, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
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incentives for inmates to engage in religious observance, and government
financial support for religious indoctrination. 121
In a similar case involving a prison program in Pennsylvania, a federal
district court judge rejected a series of motions to dismiss a lawsuit that
challenged government welfare grants to the Firm Foundation, a vocational
training program and self-described "prison ministry" for inmates. 122 The
program requires staff to adhere to Christian beliefs, actively proselytizes
inmates, and does not segregate government funds for secular purposes. 123
The plaintiffs contend that such a program violated the Establishment
Clause. 124
Other cases abound. For example, the ACLU settled a case with the
Department of Health and Human Services that challenged a one million
dollar grant to a sexual abstinence program called the Silver Ring Thing
(SRT).125 SRT held high-tech multimedia shows where members testified
about how Jesus Christ improved their lives, quoted Bible passages, and
urged teenagers to commit their lives to Jesus Christ and to purchase rings
that were inscribed with New Testament verse. 126 In the settlement, HHS
ended funding for the program as it is currently structured, made future
funds contingent on the SRT's compliance with charitable choice
restrictions, and agreed to closely monitor any future grants to the
program.127 The settlement agreement also incorporated a list of safeguards
that HHS would impose on any future grants with SRT; this document
"represents the clearest and most complete legal guidance for faith-based
grantees that has thus far been produced" by the government. 128 HHS
terminated its grant to SRT in January 2006, and the SRT is not currently
receiving funds from HHS.129
In another case involving an abstinence program, American Civil
Liberties Union v. Foster, a federal district court in Louisiana enjoined a

121.

ld.at939.

122. Moeller v. Bradford County, 2006 WL 319288 (M.D. Pa., Feb. 10,2006); Moeller v.
Bradford, 444 F. Supp. 2d 316 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
123.

Moeller, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 318.

124.

Id.

125. See Raja Misha, U.S. To End Funding of Abstinence Program. Settles a Lawsuit Filed
by the ACLU, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2006.
126. See Frank James, Faith-Based Organizations Face Suits-Groups Using Federal Funds
Are Accused of Proselytizing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2006, at 8.
127.

Id.

128. IRA Lupu & ROBERT TuTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2006: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS iii
(Roundtable on Religion and Social Policy 2006), available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.
orgldocs/legallreports/State_oLthe_Law_2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,2007).

129.

[d. at 3.
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state funding program for abstinence education that gave grants to a variety
of groups that spent money to support prayer at pro-life marches and rallies
and taught participants about '''the virgin birth and ... God's desire [for]
sexual purity as a way of life. '" The groups also conducted public school
skits that made statements "about what God and the Bible say about
abstinence," and gave engraved Bibles to children. l3o The court concluded
that state money was "being used to convey religious messages and advance
religion.,,131 and ordered the state to implement safeguards that would
prevent government abstinence funds from being used for religious
purposes. 132
These and other blatant violations of charitable choice restrictions have
several causes. Obviously, the government is not doing an adequate job of
monitoring its charitable choice grants. Moreover, the government is not
providing grantees with a clear description of how charitable choice funds
can be spent. Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle have lamented the
government's failure to define what sorts of religious activity beyond
worship and proselytizing are forbidden, thus leaving grantees in a legal
limbo. 133 The regulations and guidance issued by the White House and
federal agencies state that government may not directly support "inherently
religious activities," such as "worship, religious instruction, or
proselytizing.,,134 This statement is incomplete because it fails to recognize
that religious indoctrination can occur when social services are "intertwined
with the inculcation of religious beliefs." 135 Yet, even crystal clear
regulations would not have prevented the activities conducted by the Silver
Ring Thing or the Firm Foundation. Their activities purposely included
worship and proselytizing, which are forbidden on the face of the statute.
At bottom, the tensions within charitable choice between religiosity and
neutrality may be irreconcilable. 136 On the one hand, charitable choice is
based on the premise that personal transformations achieved through the
power of religion can solve social ills. 137 Accordingly, charitable choice
attempts to preserve the spiritual character of religious groups, which is,
after all, the supposed source of their effectiveness in delivering social

130.

American Civil Liberties Union v. Foster, 2002 WL 1733651, *3-6 (E.D. La. 2002).

131.

Id. at *7.

132.

[d. at *6-8.

133.

See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 87, at 77.

134.

[d. at 85.

135. [d. at 84. The authors also note that the Supreme Court has never used an "inherently
religious" test in considering permissible church-state activities. [d.
136. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 174 ("[W)e seem to be faced here with
a faith-based public policy that is inherently contradictory.").

137.

See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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services. 138 On the other hand, charitable choice can constitutionally fund
only secular activities, thus precluding religious service providers from
using religious content in their programs.139 It is hard to see how both
objectives can be served simultaneously. Stripped of their religious content,
the Silver Ring Thing and the Firm Foundation are simply social service
programs delivered by employees who are moved by a higher power to help
the needy. Yet this sort of motivation is not enough for proponents of
charitable choice; they want program content to be imbued with religion. 140
Even in a compliant charitable choice program, a welfare beneficiary can
receive services in a facility adorned with religious symbols and be invited
to join a voluntary prayer session by a church employee-and indeed, this is
happening. 141 Although local governments are supposed to provide
alternative secular providers in the beneficiary's geographic area (which is
often impossible in rural locales), it is not clear that needy individuals
struggling with drug addiction, homelessness, domestic violence, mental
illness, or other disabilities have the wherewithal to make such a request.
Does charitable choice really erase the risk of involuntary religious
indoctrination, which is unconstitutional under current law? Charitable
choice raises profound constitutional questions with no easy answers.
However, ten years of experience provide some evidence for considering
whether charitable choice is more of a panacea or a peril.
II. LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF CHARITABLE CHOICE

Welfare reform has effectively reduced the welfare rolls; there are half
as many people on welfare today as there were in 1996. 142 Yet welfare
reform has not eliminated poverty.143 Most former welfare recipients are
working, but remain below the poverty line, while others are unemployed
and disconnected from the welfare system. l44 These sobering results reflect
138. See Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY. L. & POL'y 167, 177 (2002) ("The [President's] Initiative's unstated but fundamental
contention is that faith-based programs ought to command government funding because they
influence the religious beliefs of clients.").
139.

See supra Part I.B (discussing the constitutional restrictions on charitable choice).

140. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 174 (the Bush Administration's
"concept of life transformation seems to confirm the idea that religious worship, preaching, and
proselytization are part of a successful program.").
141. See Heidi Rolland Unruh & Jill Witmer Sinha, A Church-Based Welfare-to-Work
Partnership, in SANCTIONING RELIGION?, supra note 13, at 69, 81; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra
note 20, at 56-59,64 (describing religious content in charitable choice programs).
142.

THE URBAN INSTITUTE, A DECADE OF WELFARE REFORM: FACTS AND FIGURES, June

2006, available at http://www.urban.org!UploadedPDF/900980_welfarereform.pdf.
143.

Id.

144.

Id.
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the fact that the drafters of welfare refonn were fixated on ending welfare
dependency, rather than on fighting poverty.145 Achieving the latter goal
would likely require more significant structural changes than welfare refonn
offers, such as a better educational system, health care coverage for all
Americans, universal child care, and improved employment opportunities. 146
By contrast, charitable choice claims to offer religious transfonnation as a
way of solving social ills. 147
Yet moral and spiritual failings are not the root causes of either welfare
dependency or poverty. This premise, put forward by charitable choice
proponents such as President Bush, ignores the far more complicated causes
of poverty, including decades of forced segregation, changes in urban
economies, declines in labor market opportunities, the erosion of the
minimum wage and low-wage income, deindustrlalization, globalization, the
decline of unions, and the increased use of contingent workers who are lowwage, part-time, and lack benefits. 148 The premise is also inaccurate; many
welfare recipients are members of faith communities and do not fit the
"profile of ... morally confused people.,,149 This emphasis on the morals of
the poor is thus dangerous because it threatens to push responsibility for the
poor onto private organizations and lets government off the hook from
grappling with structural strategies that might more effectively combat the
causes of poverty. 150 This rhetoric would not be as troubling if the actual
implementation of charitable choice aided in reducing poverty. Accordingly,
this Part assesses whether charitable choice is an effective strategy for
bringing current and fonner welfare recipients out of poverty. In tum, this
analysis sheds light on whether the constitutional risks of charitable choice
are worth taking.

145. Juliet Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty
Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 20 I, 213 (2006) ("Indeed, while ending "dependence" on
welfare is among the legislative goals of [PRA], decreasing poverty is not.").
146. See Weber, supra note 73, at 105--06 ("Many of the problems of those needing social
services are such things as lack of affordable housing, an inadequate minimum wage, and
understaffed agencies.").
147. See, e.g., FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 84 (quoting the rhetoric of President Bush and
former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros).
148. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the
Time: 1990s Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 3,
66-72 (\996); Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It''-Wrongfor Welfare, Wrong for
Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 10-13 (\994); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IMPROVING POOR
PEOPLE 77-78 (1995).

149.

SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 265.

150.

See Ross, supra note 138, at 180.
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A. Effectiveness

Charitable choice assumes that a faith-based approach to human
services is superior to a secular approach, but there is little empirical
evidence to support this assumption. lSI Comparing the performance of
secular and sectarian providers is a challenge in the highly decentralized
human services environment. 152 Moreover, it is also difficult to quantify and
measure performance-based outcomes for these services, which are intensely
interpersonal. 153 For instance, in a job training program, is success measured
by the number of recipients who obtain a part-time job? A full-time job? By
the number of participants who keep a job for more than three months? Six
months? A year? By the number of participants who obtain any job? Or a
job with benefits? Measuring the impact of faith is further complicated
because the religious content of faith-based programs varies across a wide
spectrum;154 on one end are faith-based groups that do not mention religion
at all, at the other end are those that explicitly make adherence to deeply
religious content a condition of participation. 155 In the absence of empirical
evidence, the Bush Administration has touted anecdotal evidence about a
few allegedly successful faith-based programs, and ignored horror stories
from other programs. 156 Yet, the anecdotal evidence suggests that successful
faith-based organizations cultivate intensive, long-term staff-client

lSI. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 172 ("There is no evidence that it will
save money or be more effective in changing people's lives."); KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 14
("There is no systematic evidence that the quality of services delivered by faith-based organizations
is superior to the quality of services provided by other social service providers.").
152. For the challenges inherent in studying charitable choice effectiveness, see SHEILA
SUESS KENNEDY & WOLFGANG BIELEFELD, CHARITABLE CHOICE AT WORK 1-13 (2006).

153. See SHEILA SUESS KENNEDY, CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
CHARITABLE CHOICE: FIRST RESULTS FROM THREE STATES 57 (2003), available at http://ccr.urban
center.iupui.edulPDFs/interim%20reportllnterim%20report%20PDF.pdf (noting the difficulties in
drawing comparisons due to problems in measuring outcomes "where quality is not easily quantified
and multiple objectives and constituencies frequently exist").
154. See generally Helen Rose Ebaugh et aI., Where's the Faith in Faith-Based
Organizations? Measures and Correlates of Religiosity in Faith-Based Social Service Coalitions, 84
SOC. FORCES 2259 (June 2006) (demonstrating that faith-based organizations vary widely in terms
of service religiosity, staff religiosity, and organizational religiosity); see also KRAMER ET AL., supra
note 20, at 67 (stating that the wide variety in program characteristics among faith-based
organizations "are sufficiently broad to make consideration of FBOs as a class only minimally
meaningful").
ISS. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, SAVING AMERICA: FAITH-BASED SERVICES AND THE FUTURE
OF CIVIL SOCIETY 143 (2004).

156. See Gilman, supra note 5, at 802-03; see also Mark A.R. Kleiman, Faith Based
Fudging, How a Bush-promoted Christian Prison Program Fakes Success by Massaging Data,
SLATE, Aug. 5, 2003, available at www.slate.com/idl2086617/ (explaining how a study of a Biblecentered prison program misrepresented outcomes by engaging in selection bias).
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relationships with a strong religious overlay.IS7 This sort of explicit, overt
religious content, however, is forbidden under charitable choice. 158 It may be
a desirable way to spend private dollars, but it is impermissible with public
funds.
Moreover, while anecdotal "claims about the success of particular faithbased programs are widespread . . . there is typically no control group for
comparison.,,159 Even where a control group is used, the data is often
misleading. For instance, President Bush often points to the success of the
InnerChange Freedom Initiative, the same evangelical, in-prison
rehabilitation program that a federal district court judge in Iowa recently
found unconstitutional. 160 InnerChange "encourages inmates to tum from
their sinful past, see the world through God's eyes, and surrender to God's
will. This model promotes the transformation of the inmate from the inside
out through the miraculous power of God's love.,,161 A prominent and ofttouted 2003 study of InnerChange found that recidivism rates for the
InnerChange offenders were significantly lower than for prisoners who did
not take part in the program. 162 However, the study only considered success
rates for graduates and did not take into account that over half the
InnerChange participants did not complete the program because they were
released from prison, dropped out, or were expelled. 163 When these nongraduating participants were factored into the data, the differences between
the InnerChange participants and the comparison groups evaporated, with
the Innerchange participants actually faring slightly worse in terms of
recidivism. 164
A major study by the non-partisan Center for Urban Policy and the
Environment compared the performance of faith-based and secular entities
delivering job training and placement services to welfare recipients in
Indiana pursuant to the T ANF statute. 165 The preliminary findings of the
researchers were that faith-based job training and placement services "were

157.

See WUTHNOW, supra note 155, at 160--61.

158.

42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (2000).

159. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 15 (noting that there is a selection bias in faithbased interventions, stating "those who choose to participate in faith-based programs and those who
stay in such programs may have an explicit affinity to the religious or spiritual grounding of the
intervention").
160.

See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.

161. The Innerchange Freedom Initiative, http://www.ifiprison.orgiprogram_Details/
ATranf.ModeIl generic.asp?ID=969 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
162.

KENNEDY & BIELEFELD,

163.

Id.

supra note 152, at 30.

164.

Id.

165.

See generally KENNEDY, supra note 153.
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somewhat less effective that those of secular organizations.,,166 While both
faith-based and secular providers were able to put welfare recipients in jobs
at the same placement rates and at similar hourly wages, the clients of the
faith-based providers worked substantially fewer hours per week and were
less likely to have health insurance. 167 The study, however, does not shed
light on other forms of social service provisions. Another study of Los
Angeles welfare-to-work programs found that no type of providergovernmental, non-profit, or religious-was superior or inferior to others. 168
Each type of program had certain advantages. 169 For-profit providers had the
highest placement rates, government programs had employees who were
particularly helpful, and faith-based organizations and other non-profits were
perceived as most empathetic by clients. 170
While most researchers agree that faith-based organizations bring
unique attributes to the human services field due to their strong community
ties, 17l there is no evidence that these attributes can be harnessed to create
better outcomes or that these benefits cannot be realized when churches set
up religiously affiliated non-profits.
B. Limited Congregational Capacity

Charitable choice seeks to "level the playing field" by opening up
government grant opportunities to religious organizations. 172 In particular,
the government is seeking to include congregations within charitable choice
initiatives. 173 Yet the evidence suggests that congregations are ill-suited to
playa meaningful role in human services delivery. In the leading analysis of
congregational activity, Professor Mark Chaves examined data from the
National Congregations Study and concluded that charitable choice is

166.

Id. at iv.

167.

Id.

168.

See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 14.

169.

See id. at 14-15.

170.

See id.

171.

See id. at 41.

172. See Steven K. Green, A Legacy of Discrimination? The Rhetoric and Reality of the
Faith-Based Initiative: Oregon as a Case Study, 84 OR. L. REv. 724, 730 (2005) (discussing the
Bush Administration's claim that religious organizations are discriminated against in government
funding programs).

173. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 8-10, 121; U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv.,
Admin. for Children and Families, Compassion Capital Fund, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ccf/
(providing information about the fund and listing grant opportunities); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVE: IMPROVEMENTS IN MONITORING GRANTEES
AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE COULD ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY 22 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d06616.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].
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unlikely to alter existing patterns of congregational involvement in social
services. 174 Although a majority of congregations are involved in social
service activities, these activities constitute a peripheral aspect of
congregational life. 175 Only 6% of all congregations report that they have a
staff person who devotes at least 25% of his or her time to social services,
and congregations spend a median average of 3% of their total budgets, or
$1200, on social service programs.176 Most charitable efforts are
spearheaded by a tiny, dedicated core of volunteers within a congregation. 177
Thus, congregations are best suited to organizing small groups to perform
discrete tasks.178 As a result, most congregational activity focuses on
assisting with emergency needs of the poor for food, clothing, and shelter,
"rather than in programs requiring more sustained and personal involvement
to meet longer-term needs, such as programs in the areas of health,
education ... , domestic violence, substance abuse, tutoring or mentoring,
and work or employment." 179 Detailed jurisdictional studies from
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Indianapolis confirm Chaves' findings and
conclude that welfare reform is not spurring congregations to develop social
service programs. 180
Moreover, congregations do not deliver these discrete social services in
a particularly holistic or transformational way. Rather, services are provided
with only minimal, short-term contact with the needy, thus undercutting
claims that churches develop long-term connections with service recipients
that integrate the needy into faith communities. 181 While many
congregations are focused on moral uplift of their members, in-depth studies
reveal that congregational services do not transfer morals to non-member
clients who receive social services, in part due to differences in class and
race between church members and clients. 182 Moreover, comparisons of
secular and sectarian providers demonstrate that religious groups are no

174. See MARK CHAVES, CONGREGATIONS IN AMERICA 7 (2004). This study is considered
the "gold standard" in tenus of research of congregational activity because of its comprehensiveness,
although it may underestimate the amount of social services provided by congregations. See
WUTHNOW, supra note 155, at 38-41.
175. See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 47-50 (noting the "peripheral nature of social services
for most congregations").
176.

See id. at 50.

177.

See id. at 55.

178.

See id. at 290.

179.
studies).

[d. at 47, 59-{i0; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 10-14 (summarizing

180. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 291 (discussing Wisconsin and Pennsylvania);
FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 55 (discussing Indianapolis).
18 \.

See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 59-{)0.

182.

See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 85, 92-93.
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more or less likely to utilize holistic strategies in aiding clients. I 83 And "even
when congregations set out to provide more holistic care, those efforts often
flounder on the rocky shore of social boundaries and complex realities" that
shape the lives of the poor. 184
Most congregational social service activity is done in collaboration with
other organizations, ranging from other churches to secular non-profits to
government agencies. 185 A typical example is a church that provides
volunteers for a soup kitchen where the food comes from a secular food
bank and a publicly funded cook prepares the food. 186 Due to resource
constraints, congregations are more likely to run food pantries than soup
kitchens; when they cannot afford to provide services themselves, they will
often collaborate with other groupS.187 Therefore, rather than being a
freestanding alternative to secular providers, this pattern of collaboration
demonstrates that "congregation-based social services often are integrated
into community social welfare systems.,,188 In sum, research on
congregations shows that churches play an integral and important role in
meeting discrete, immediate needs within their communities, as well as in
collaborating with professionalized service providers. However,
congregations generally lack either the resources or desire to engage in more
complex forms of social service delivery.
Although well-meaning, congregations that have pursued larger
ambitions have often faltered. 189 For instance, the Faith and Families
program in Mississippi was received with great fanfare on the national stage
when Governor Fordice announced that the state would link welfare
recipients with congregations, who were to serve as mentors. 190 The

183.

See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 63-64.

184.

Id. at 63.

185. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 68 (congregations are "more likely to serve as points
of access and referral for public and private agencies offering health, human services, and other
forms of assistance"); WUTHNOW, supra note 155, at 100. Collaboration is most likely among large,
mainline-Protestant, theologically liberal congregations and least likely among evangelical
congregations. See CHAVES, supra note 174, at 69. African-American churches are most likely to
collaborate with secular groups. Id.
186.

See CHA YES, supra note 174, at 70.

187. See RAM A. CNAAN, THE INVISIBLE CARING HAND: AMERICAN CONGREGATIONS AND
THE PROVISION OF WELFARE 71 (2002).
188. Id. at 73. These collaborations neither discourage a holistic approach, as conservatives
fear, nor dampen congregations' political activism, as liberals fear. Id. at 92. See also WUTHNOW,
supra note 155, at 61 ("Congregations are more likely, it appears, to help other organizations supply
services than to invest heavily in organizing formal programs of their own.").

189. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 69 ("There is an abundance of evidence that
congregations have difficulty sustaining community development or delivering social welfare
services.").
190.

Id.
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adoptive churches were expected to provide material resources, such as job
training, as well as moral guidance in the hopes of moving welfare recipients
toward self-sufficiency. 191 Yet in the first two and half years of the program,
only ninety-eight families volunteered for the program and of these, only
twenty-one families were able to leave welfare. 192 The program was
eventually terminated. 193 Reflecting on the program, one scholar explains
that the congregations simply did not have the ability to "sustain ongoing,
effective assistance for the families they adopt.,,194 Poor families face a bevy
of interrelated problems that the average congregation could not handle
while also meeting the spiritual needs of its members. 195
Furthermore, it is not clear that congregations are needed to level the
human services playing field. Indeed, the "unlevel playing field" analogy is
misleading because the pre-charitable choice federal procurement system for
social services did not discriminate against faith-based providers. 196 From
the founding of this country, governments and religious groups have had an
intertwined, and often collaborative, relationship in providing social
welfare. 197 During the twentieth century, governments at all levels
extensively funded religiously affiliated nonprofit groups to deliver services
to the needy.198 For instance, in 1993, government funding accounted for
92% of the budget of Lutheran Social Ministries, 65% of Catholic Charities,
and 75% of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services. '99 This
historic pattern of interrelationships between government and faith-based
organizations spurred one charitable choice proponent to remark, even prior
to the enactment of the PRA, "when it comes to public money and religious
nonprofit organizations, sacred and secular mix.,,2oo

191. See JOHN P. BARTKOWSKI & HELEN A. REGIS, CHARITABLE CHOICES: RELIGION, RACE,
AND POVERTY IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 173 (2003).
192.

See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 70.

193. Explanations for the demise of the program vary. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra
note 191, at 63.
194.

FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 70.

195.

See id.

196.

See Green, supra note 160, at 753-61.

197. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN'PUBLIC SERVICE: GoVERNMENT-NONPROFIT
RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 33-34 (\995).

198.

See Green, supra note 160, at 754--57.

199. [d. at 1. Religious groups created these separate affiliates to be eligible for government
social service funds, because governing Supreme Court caselaw until the mid-1990s stated that
government could not fund "pervasively sectarian" organizations. See infra notes 82-92 and
accompanying text. While these affiliated organizations were built upon a religious motivation to
provide social services, they did so in a more secular environment. See Ryden and Polet, supra note
\3, at 1-2.
200.

[d. at I; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 3, 40 ("Many faith-based social
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As far back as 1899, the Supreme Court upheld a congressional
appropriation for construction of a Catholic hospital, reasoning that the
hospital provided secular services. 201 In 1988, in Bowen v. Kendrick, the
Supreme Court upheld a federal grant program that funded religious
organizations, among others, to counsel pregnant teenagers, while
prohibiting abortion-related services or information. 202 As these cases
demonstrate, there has never been an outright ban on the participation of
religiously-affiliated organizations in federal grant programs. A major pre1996 study of faith-based contracting at the state and local level found that
local governmental officials "welcomed the participation of faith-based
organizations.,,203 The study "found little indication that public officials
were hostile to [faith based organizations]" and there were no "allegations
from the [faith based organizations] about past or present ill treatment.,,204
Thus, claims of anti-religious discrimination are overstated and fail to
distinguish between churches and affiliates of religious organizations, who
have long been eligible to apply for federal grants. 205 Although most
congregations have limited administrative capacity for complex human
services grants, there are many highly professional religiously affiliated
organizations that can deliver these services. Thus, there is little warrant for
spending millions of dollars to increase the technical and administrative
capacity of congregations to battle over an ever-decreasing slice of the
federal social service pie.
C. Accountability

The charitable choice statute provides that religious organizations are
subject to the same regulations as other contractors "to account in accord
with generally accepted auditing principles for the use of such funds.,,206
However, this narrow accountability requirement is not sufficient to ensure
that religious grantees deliver on their contractual obligations or maintain
the legally required separation between religious practices and service
delivery.207 Current research shows that congregational leaders and staff lack
the knowledge and competence to understand the complicated constitutional

service organizations contracted with government long before Charitable Choice and continue to do
so.").
201.

Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1899).

202.

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 589.

203.

See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 4.

204.

[d.

205.

See Green, supra note 172, at 755-56.

206.

42 U.S.C. § 604a(h) (2000).

207.

See Gilman, supra note 5, at 853 (explaining the narrowness of this provision).
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restnctIons on the use of government funds. 208 For instance, a survey of
congregational leaders revealed that sixty-seven percent did not know that
they were prohibited from using their government funds for religious
activities such as prayer or bible study.209 For its part, the government is not
doing enough to educate congregations about their rights and
responsibilities. According to a recent report by the General Accounting
Office (GAO), almost all the federal agencies studied told grantees that they
were not permitted to spend money on "inherently religious activities," but
less than half of the agencies informed grantees about the rights of program
beneficiaries or provided them with information about permissible hiring
practices.21O Not surprisingly then, four of the thirteen faith-based
organizations that provided voluntary religious activities such as prayer did
not separate them in either time or location from the federally-funded
services.21l The GAO further found that most federal agencies are not
monitoring contracts to see whether grantees are complying with
constitutional safeguards or standards that protect beneficiaries from
discrimination.212 Moreover, the single audit required by the statute does not
include checks for these safeguards,213 and site visits to grantee programs are
rare. 214 The "bewildering variety and complexity" of faith-based
organizations can make it difficult for government to devise regulatory
oversight mechanisms,215 suggesting further that accountability is much
tougher to ensure than charitable choice drafters envisioned.
While the federal government struggles with maintammg
accountability, many congregations struggle as well because they are
unprepared to deal with the requirements of government procurement
processes. Unlike highly regarded non-profits such as Catholic Charities and
the Salvation Army, which are widely seen as some of the most effective
community-based organizations in the country,216 most congregations have
neither adequate staff nor the capacity for the data management and

208.

See KENNEDY & BIELEFELD, supra note 152, at iv.

209.

See id. at v.

210. See GAO Report, supra note 173, at 29; see also KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 6062 (documenting that beneficiaries are not being notified of their right to seek services from an
alternate provider).
211.

See GAO Report, supra note 173, at 34.

212.

ld.at29.

213.

See id. at 29, 36.

214.

Seeid.at37.

215. PETER DOBKIN HALL, ACCOUNTABILITY IN FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF CHARITABLE CHOICE II (2002), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edui
-phalliARNOV A-FBOO/020ACCOUNTABILITY.pdf.

216.

See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 68.
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reporting that are required to meet government accountability
mechanisms. 217 Congregations focus on a religious mission and generally
lack the accoutrements of professional management, such as staffing, office
space and technology, planning, and administrative competence.218 Clergy
are generally not trained in administration, and churches often rely on lay
volunteers for accounting because they cannot afford professional financial
services. 219 This limited capacity is why so many congregations tum to
established nonprofits when they are seeking services for the needy.22o
While some larger churches can amass the resources to be effective partners
in government procurement, "the reality of the situation is that most
congregations are much too small to have a broad impact and are too small,
even, to write the grant applications or leverage the funds necessary to
compete in the public or foundation funding arena.,,221 Charitable choice
may reinforce racial and class inequality because some smaller
congregations, as well as denominations headed by part-time clergy, cannot
compete effectively for grants. 222 For example, researchers in Mississippi
found that bi-vocational ministers are concentrated in black churches that
have low-income membership.223 Such churches are disadvantaged in
applying for and managing government contracts.
Although President Bush is pushing millions of dollars toward building
the technical capacity of small, faith-based groups such as congregations,
there is still reluctance on the part of some churches to avail themselves of
these funds because of their own awareness of capacity limitations and
concerns about government entanglement with their religious beliefs. 224 In
addition, some churches fear that data collection and performance
measurement will impersonalize the service they provide, as well as work to
stigmatize beneficiaries by singling them out for data collection. 225 At
bottom, the contractual norms of charitable choice that aim to protect

217.

See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 42-43.

218. See WUTHNOW, supra note ISS, at III (noting that when non-profits got involved in
government contracting, there ensued "a revolution in nonprofit management, producing a
pronounced shift in power from boards and volunteers to cadres of paid professionally-trained
staff'); KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 42 (Small FBOs "lack sophisticated organizational and
financial structures, including adequate policies regarding governing boards, financial record
keeping, and fundraising and employment practices.").
219.

See WUTHNOW, supra note ISS, at III.

220.

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 308.

221.

FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 74.

222.

See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 173.

223.

Seeid.at 173-74.

224.
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 293 ("Most congregations have neither the
administrative capacity nor the inclination to serve as social service agencies.").
225.

See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 164.
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beneficiaries and ensure quality services tend to conflict with the
"covenantal impetus and moral bases" that underlie church outreach to the
poor.226 As one commentator summarizes, "Working within a ministry, a
religious group is accountable only to God; working under contract
inevitably subjects faith communities to oversight and monitoring that may
compromise not only their beliefs, but their constitutional freedoms.,,227
Charitable choice resolves the tension between religious freedom and
contractual accountability by erring on the side of non-entanglement. The
law has long shielded religious organizations from government intrusion so
as to promote the free exercise of religion and to avoid the government
establishment of religion. 228 Thus, lawmakers and courts tread lightly where
religious groups are involved, treating religious groups "as nearly sovereign
entities.,,229 For instance, as a matter of state corporate law, churches
generally have greater freedom than other nonprofits to structure their
organizational form, and they are subject to less oversight from state
agencies, even though they obtain identical tax benefits as other
nonprofits. 230 Similarly, churches are awarded automatic tax-exempt status
from the IRS.231 They not only can forgo the tax-exempt application, but
also do not have to go through the annual reporting required from secular
nonprofits, which provides the public with valuable information about the
sources of the nonprofit's financial support; net assets; the breakdown of
expenses between fundraising, management, and program expenditures; staff
salaries; and program activities. 232
Moreover, the tort liability of religious organizations is more limited
than that of other non-profits, which already have substantial protections
against lawsuits.233 The Supreme Court has long held that the First
Amendment bars courts from adjudicating religious questions. 234 As a result,
courts cannot inquire into the validity of religious beliefs, they cannot
independently interpret religious texts, and they cannot examine the internal

226.

Id. at 171.

227.

WUTHNOW, supra note ISS, at 112.

228.
See generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline oj
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. LJ. 219 (2000).
229.

See HALL, supra note 215, at 3.

230.

See Gilman, supra note 5, at 838.

231.

I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3) and 508(a), (c)(I)(A).

232.

IRS, Dep't of Treas., Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ (2006), available at

http;llwww.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990-ez.pef. For the benefits of the Form 990 in maintaining non-

profit accountability, see generally Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool Jor
501(c)(3) Nonprojits, 51 TAX LAW. 571 (1998).

233.

See Idleman, supra note 228, at 220-27.

234.

See id. at 220-27 (describing caselaw).
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decision-making of religious entities.235 The reluctance of courts to interfere
with religious practices has resulted in many courts dismissing tort claims
against churches and clergy, such as breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
hiring and supervision, tortious interference with contract, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and defamation. 236
In addition to the protection from lawsuits, many states exempt
religious groups not only from taxation, but also from licensing and
inspection requirements that apply to other non-profits. 237 For instance, in
eleven states, non-profit secular day care centers must comply with a bevy of
detailed regulations about staff-child ratios, cleanliness, safety, academic
programming, and other quality of care standards, while day care centers at
churches are free to ignore most, if not all, of these requirements. 238 Since
1989, congressional legislation has provided religious groups with more than
200 exemptions or special arrangements not available to other non-profits or
for-profit businesses in areas ranging from immigration to land use to
pensions.239 For welfare recipients, this hands-off approach risks placing
them in the hands of religious groups that lack the skills, training, or
competence to deliver social services, while denying them any avenues for
recourse.
All of these doctrines, designed to promote the free exercise of religion,
shield religious groups from public scrutiny. In tum, this inadvertently
defeats external attempts to keep congregations accountable to the public for
the money they are spending to deliver social services. 24o When religious
groups are operating in the private sphere, their members, donors, and
service recipients generally have a choice whether or not to associate with
the organization, and these various constituents can disengage for any
reason. 241 Yet when a religious group is delivering federally funded social
services, taxpayers and beneficiaries do not always have the choice to opt
out. Particularly given the capacity limitations of many congregations,
accountability mechanisms should be more rigorous for these groups, yet,
current practice is to the contrary.

235.

/d.

236.

See Gilman, supra note 5, at 840--42.

237. See Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A I.
238. [d. Texas dropped the exemption for daycare centers established when President Bush
was Governor because there was ten times the rate of abuse and neglect cases at the unlicensed,
sectarian facilities. /d.
239.

[d.

240.

See Gilman, supra note 5, at 822-23.

241.

[d. at 839.
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III. CONGREGATIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

Although most congregations lack the capacity to deliver
comprehensive social services, they still have much to offer government in
fighting poverty because of the pivotal role they play within communities
and for their members. Scholars who study religion have focused
increasingly on the concept of social capitaI,242 which consists of "social
relationships based on trust that have value or can be used productively.,,243
Although it is difficult to generalize across the vast diversity of
congregational life in the United States,244 congregations generally share one
feature-they are valuable reservoirs of social capital. Social capital is
grouped into two categories: bonding and bridging.245 Bonding capital is
"inward looking" and happens within social groups.246 Within
congregations, bonding capital develops from communal worship, shared
religious norms, social support, and mutual aid to members. 247 By contrast,
bridging social capital is "outward looking," and develops when groups that
do not necessarily share the same cultural background or common identity
forge on-going relationships of truSt. 248 For instance, many congregations
collaborate with other religious groups, community organizations, and
governmental agencies in social service programs to help the needy.249 Also,
in many low-income communities, churches provide personal connections,
mentoring relationships, and leadership opportunities for members that serve
as a bridge to the "wider world of work and social service.,,25o This Part
explores the social capital within the black church.25I Although this Part

242.

See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 18.

243.

SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 9.

244. Congregations range from megachurches to small storefront churches;
fundamentalist to liberal denominations. See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 101.

245.

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 11-12.

246.

BARTOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 222, at 19.

247.

See id. at 19; CNAAN, supra note 187, at 261.

248.

See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 19.

249.

See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 71,141,261.

from

250. SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 266. Congregations are often the local organizations
with the longest history in the neighborhood, they have a tradition of helping those in need, and they
can mobilize volunteers. See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 108.
251. Although this Article focuses on the social capital within the black church, it is
important to note that congregations playa similarly important role in other minority neighborhoods
and in rural areas. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 41; Melanie D. Acevedo, Note, Client
Choices, Community Values: Why Faith-Based Legal Services Providers are Good/or Poverty Law,
70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1491, 1529-30 (2002) ("Poor communities, particularly urban communities of
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highlights some limits inherent within social capital, it concludes that
churches can be valuable partners to government in fighting poverty. Most
importantly, congregations are reservoirs of moral legitimacy, and they are
already important partners in social service networks. 252
A. The Black Church

An examination of the social capital within urban, African-American
churches in low-income communities is particularly useful in illustrating the
two forms of social capital and how they can contribute to a more effective
welfare system. Also, urban African-American neighborhoods are focal
points for welfare reform efforts because they are disproportionately poor. 253
Leading religion scholars Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya have stated
that "[t]he black church has no challenger as the cultural womb of the black
community.,,254 This is especially true in poor, inner-city neighborhoods
where churches are often the only viable social institutions. 255 The Bush
Administration has targeted black churches by encouraging them to engage

color, do, in fact, value their faith institutions. Within the African American and Latino
communities, the church, and increasingly, the mosque, is the center of the social and political, as
well as spiritual, activity of the community.").

252.

See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 77.

253. See Ruth McCoy, Expedited Permanency: Implications for African-American Children
and Families, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 475, 478 (2005) ("African-American families have been
disproportionately impacted by both the 1961 and 1996 welfare legislation because they comprise a
disproportionate amount of the impoverished families in the United States."). At the same time, it is
important to recognize that much of welfare reform was fueled by racist images of urban African
Americans, particularly women. See Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune.
New Lyrics?, II GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 389, 392-93 (2004) ("Inner-city AfricanAmerican families never constituted more than twenty percent of all the people on welfare. They
never even constituted a majority of African-Americans on welfare. Yet the politicized stereotype of
the typical welfare recipient-the image that millions of Americans carried in their minds-was that
of a never-married inner-city African-American woman who kept getting pregnant in order to get a
bigger welfare check. Factually incorrect. Demonstrably. Never mind that the racially driven
backlash against welfare would hurt more non-blacks than blacks; nevertheless, a racially connected
anti-welfare politics began to take hold.").
254. C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 8 (1990). The term "black church" is used as a "term of art for expressing
the centrality of Black churches in Black communities." Michele M. SimmsParris, What Does It

Mean to See a Black Church Burning?: Understanding the Significance of Constitution alizing Hate
Speech, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 127, 131 (1998). Nevertheless, there are "innumerable differences" in
black churches in America that arise from denominational affiliations, political philosophies,
geographical location, surrounding communities, and other social differences.ld. at 131-32.

255. See R. Khari Brown & Ronald E. Brown, Faith and Works: Church-Based Social
Capital Resources and African American Political Activism, 82 Soc. FORCES 617 (2003) ("Churches
are often the only nongovernmental institution in black communities.").
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in charitable choice programs,256 and as a result, the black church must
confront the benefits and detriments of accepting government funding. 257
The history of the black church has its roots in slavery.258 Religion not
only aided black Americans in coping with slavery and racial segregation,
but it was the only "stable and coherent" social institution that emerged
against the strictures of extreme racism. 259 Although religion was imposed
on slaves by their masters, slaves also held secret, independent religious
gatherings that resisted white culture and laid the foundation for the black
church. 26o Post-emancipation, mutual aid societies and churches were the
first social institutions that free blacks created.26I In the mid to late
Nineteenth Century, black churches developed a "civic tradition that
nurtures a sense of charity for the poor and an active engagement in political
life. ,,262 Churches became the center of black life, and they were the
"incubator behind schools, business enterprises, charity, politics, and
recreation.,,263 In the early twentieth century, urban churches absorbed and
helped acclimate thousands of migrants from the rural South. 264
In the 1960s, the black church was the anchor of the Civil Rights
Movement. 265 Black clergy were instrumental in the movement, and black
churches provided meeting space, a mobilized base of supporters, and
financial support. 266 In the post-civil rights era, most black churches agreed
that they needed to be engaged in both community outreach and political

256. See Frank A. Pryor III & David K. Ryden, Serving the Inner City: Social Programs in
Black Churches, in SANCTIONING RELIGION?, supra note 13, at 131.
257. See generally Fredrick C. Harris, Black Churches and Civic Traditions: Outreach,
Activism, and the Politics of Public Funding of Faith-Based Ministries, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE
WORK? COVERING RELIGION'S IMPACT ON URBAN AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL SERVICES 240, 240
(Andrew Walsh ed., 2001).
258.

See LINCOLN & MAMIY A, supra note 254, at 7, 92-93.

259.

Id.

260.

See SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 135-38.

261.

See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 8.

262.

See Harris, supra note 257, at 140.

263.

Id. at 142.

264. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 119-23. Although most churches were too
financially strained by mortgage obligations on church property to offer significant community
outreach programs, churches were active in publicly denouncing racially motivated violence against
blacks. !d. at 120-21; Harris, supra note 257, at 143; SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 138. Several
prominent large churches did have major social service initiatives during this time.
265.

See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 211-12.

266. See id. at 165; Harris, supra note 257, at 144-45. Not all black churches supported the
movement; nevertheless, the black churches that were involved served as the "institutional center"
for mobilization. See SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 138.
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matters, although they differed about how to achieve these goals. 267 In short,
throughout American history, the black church has provided "opportunities
for participation, leadership, and cultural expression in a society where few
other such opportunities were available."268 Despite denominational,
doctrinal, and cultural differences across the broad spectrum of black
congregations,269 the black church collectively offers social structure in
addition to spiritual solace and thus continues to occupy "an unparalleled
position as a foundational social institution in the African American
community.,,27o For all these reasons, the black church has been called a
"nation within a nation.,,271
Today, in low-income African-American communities, the black
church is not only a spiritual center but also continues to serve as the "base
community for recreation, career matters, and many other aspects of daily
life."272 Bonding social capital is generated by concerted efforts at
community building--congregants actively recruit new members, offer
social events, take an interest in the personal welfare of fellow members, and
offer assistance to needy members. 273 These churches also create bridging
social capital. A study by Joanne Schneider of welfare reform in Wisconsin
and Pennsylvania found that African-American churches serving lowincome communities helped members adapt to norms of white, middle-class
social and work environments, which, in tum, helped members obtain and
keep jobs. 274 Many black churches offer their members leadership roles that
exceed the responsibilities of their paid work. 275 In tum, these skills propel
members into roles within the wider community.276 These churches are thus
a source of empowerment and change for their members. 277 Studies further
establish that black churches are more likely than white churches to teach
civic skills, foster political participation, and provide social services for their

267.

See Harris, supra note 257, at 140.

268. Nancy T. Ammennan, Still Gathering After All These Years: Congregations in U.S.
Cities, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE WORK?, supra note 257, at 8.

269.

See SimmsParris, supra note 254, at 133.

270.

Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 131.

271.

See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 254, at 8 (quoting E. Franklin Frazier).

272.

SCHNEIDER, supra

273.

See id. at 268-69.

274.

See id. at 266, 270.

n~te

108, at 268.

275.

Id. at 274. Congregations are places where people learn "organizational, bureaucratic,
and leadership skills." FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 3.

276.

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 274.

277.

Id. at 293-94.
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members. 278 In many inner-city churches, a majority of members commute
from more affluent neighborhoods, and the financial and social resources of
these members allow such congregations to have active social service
programs. 279
The "bridging" social capital developed by black churches benefits not
only members, but also poor non-members within the geographic
community. Black churches are "significantly more involved than their
white counterparts in providing programs for the pOOr.,,280 Almost all black
churches have some sort of social outreach ministry; the majority of
programs focus on youth, food and clothing banks, and prison ministries.z 81
Moreover, many churches serve a valuable role in connecting the needy to
available social services outside the congregation. 282 The bridging social
capital of black churches goes beyond their immediate neighborhoods; black
churches are also central to urban cities and are more likely than white
churches to be actively engaged in urban politics and community economic
development. 283 The clergy of large black churches often serve as a moral
voice for the city as a whole,284 and the black church has launched the
careers of many civic and politicalleaders. 285
Perhaps as a result of the centrality of the black church in the lives of
African Americans, they are the most religious group of citizens within the
United States. 286 Surveys show that 82% of African Americans belong to a
church, versus 67% of whites. 287 Similarly, 82% of African Americans say
religion is "very important in their life," as compared to 55% of whites. 288
African Americans also see churches as the most important institution for

278.

See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 100, 110, 262.

279. See Amrnennan, supra note 268, at 8. Members of black churches are less likely than
other church members to live in the neighborhood where their church is located. See FARNSLEY,
supra note 14, at 52. In Indianapolis, only thirty-six percent of black church members lived in the
neighborhood. Id. Thus, one cannot assume that black churches are neighborhood churches. Id.
280.

Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 132.

281. DAVID A. BOSITIS, BLACK CHURCHES AND THE FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE, JOINT
CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 7 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.joint
center.org/publications I /publication-PDFslFAITH3 .pdf.

282. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 291; CNAAN, supra note 187, at 66,294 (churches
serve as brokers between service system and local residents).
283. See Amrnennan, supra note 268, at 8. Black churches are more involved in community
development (twenty-two percent) than other churches. [d. at 18.
284.

See id. at 8.

285. See Kelly Brown Douglas & Ronald E. Hopson, Understanding the Black Church: The
Dynamics o/Change, 2 J. RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 95,99 (2001).
286.

See Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 131.

287.

See id.

288.

See id.
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alleviating social problems in black communities. 289 Not surprisingly,
African Americans are also more interested than whites in partnering with
government to solve social problems; 64% of African Americans support the
idea, versus 28% of whites. 29o However, the extent and form of such a
partnership is controversial within the black community.291
While a majority of black clergy view charitable choice as a good
match for the "historically rich activism of black churches," others fear that
partnerships with government will dilute the political activism and moral
authority of the black church. 292 In general, more theologically liberal
congregations, as well as black civil rights organizations oppose charitable
choice, while more conservative denominations welcome the outreach of the
Bush Administration. 293 Some black leaders are suspicious of President
Bush's attention, fearing that the initiative is designed to woo black voters to
the Republican Party as well as a cover for the cutbacks in federal funds
available for public assistance. 294 There are also concerns that charitable
choice will be used as tool for political patronage that could corrupt black
communities "by rewarding contracts to activist ministers and churches who
might be lured into accepting contracts in exchange for their support of
political campaigns or policy initiatives.,,295 In short, black church leaders
are well aware that they have substantial social capital to contribute to
welfare programs, but they are tom on whether to put that capital at the
service of the federal government.
Black clergy are also concerned about the capacity constraints that face
their congregations. A nationwide survey of black church clergy found that
only three percent of black churches are engaged in charitable choice
programs. 296 Although three-quarters of black ministers are aware of
charitable choice, fewer than one in three had a detailed understanding of the
289.

See Brown & Brown, supra note 255, at 618 (2003).

290.

See Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 132.

291.

See id. at 139.

292. Id. at 129. Black congregations are more likely than other congregations to be willing to
apply for public funding. See Michael Leo Owens, Which Congregations Will Take Advantage of
Charitable Choice? Explaining the Pursuit ofPublic Funding by Congregations, 87 Soc. SCI. Q. 55,
70 (2006); Bositis, supra note 281, at 4.
293.

See Pryor & Ryden, supra note 256, at 134.

294.

See id. at 133-34.

295. Harris, supra note 257, at 154. These fears have not been borne out by the evidence.
Data shows that theologically liberal black congregations in traditionally Democratic states
constitute the majority of charitable choice grant recipients among black churches. Bositis, supra
note 281, at 6.
296. The number may actually be somewhere between three and eleven percent because
many churches that receive government grants through state and local governments are not aware
that they are receiving federal funds that pass through local governments. See Bositis, supra note
281, at 5.
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President's initiative or had spoken with a lawyer or accountant about the
program's requirements. 297 Only one out of nine black churches had applied
for a charitable choice grant, and applicants were generally larger churches
with higher revenues and a liberal theology.298 Thirty-one percent of black
church applicants were awarded funds, and these recipients shared the
attributes of being larger, wealthier, and more progressive. 299 By contrast,
smaller churches, particularly those in rural areas, do not feel they have the
capability to apply; "they not only have limited resources, but they are also
embedded in a very limited network.,,30o Thus, although black churches are
more likely to have existing social service programs than other churches,
they are less involved in charitable choice. This suggests that there is plenty
of room for government to work effectively with black churches on
alleviating poverty, but that charitable choice, as currently structured, may
not be the best vehicle for such partnerships.
B. Social Capital Perils and Promise

Charitable choice proponents are very enthusiastic about the untapped
social capital in churches, but there is almost no discussion of the potential
dark side to social capital. Congregations in America usually consist of
members who share the same racial, ethnic, and socio-economic
backgrounds. 301 While these commonalities foster bonding social capital,302
homogeneity can also have a coercive side that perpetuates racial and class
inequality.303 This homogeneity, along with the strict moral values and belief
systems held by many denominations, can result in congregations excluding
outsiders or withholding their assistance to persons deemed unworthy.304
Even when they provide services to those in need, many congregations
distinguish sharply between members and service recipients, and as a result,
few outside aid recipients actually end up joining the congregation. 305
Moreover, social hierarchies can exist within congregations based on age,

297.

ld. at 4.

298.

See id. at 4.

299.

See id. at 5.

300. ld. at 5. "Only three percent of the smallest churches applied for [a charitable choice]
grant, and none received one." ld. at 6.
301.

See BARTKOWSKI &

302.

See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 262.

303.

See

SCHNEIDER,

supra note 108, at 12;

304.

See

SCHNEIDER,

supra note 108, at 270;

REGIS,

supra note 191, at 20;

FARNSLEY,

supra note 14, at 110.

BARTKOWSKI & REGIS,
CNAAN,

supra note 191, at 20.

supra note 187, at 245;

BARTKOWSKI

& REGIS, supra note 191, at 21.

305. See CNAAN, supra note 187, at 244-45. Most intermittent relief is for members and is
often given with cultural judgments attached. See BARTKOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 191, at 165-67.
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gender, and other cultural factors, and thus, charitable choice could
inadvertently replicate these patterns in serving the needy.306
Further, extensive bonding social capital within a congregation can
sometimes result in less bridging social capital. For instance, a recent study
of Mississippi churches found tight bonding within black congregations.
However, as a result of those internal bonds, black churches lagged behind
white churches in forming interdenominational partnerships.307 Similarly,
another cross-jurisdictional study of welfare reform in Philadelphia,
Milwaukee, and Kenosha, Wisconsin found that churches serving the
poorest neighborhoods had no intention of developing bridging capital,
choosing instead to focus internally on providing a safety net, spiritual
support, and a social life for economically struggling members. 308 For these
churches, the long history of racial segregation and oppression resulted in a
lack of trust in mainstream organizations and a corresponding emphasis on
inward-looking se1f-help.309
Thus, social capital does not always reinforce norms of social equality.
To the degree charitable choice is founded on the notion that local churches
will convert the morally destitute into devout members, the evidence
suggests that social divides will preclude this transformation. 3lo At the same
time, it is doubtful that such a transformation is even necessary. Religion can
be a powerful adjunct to the fight against poverty not because poor people
are unmoored from moral or spiritual values, but rather because most poor
people are already connected to faith communities.311 Moreover,
congregations are the primary social institution in America where poverty is
regularly confronted, discussed, and tackled.312 The challenge is to ensure
that faith communities can playa meaningful role in welfare reform based
on realistic expectations of their capacity. Assessments by welfare reform
researchers across the country uniformly confirm that churches are integral
to connecting the needy to social services and that, with adequate technical
assistance and funding, these congregations could serve as even more
effective intermediaries for their members and other needy persons within
their communities.

306.

See BARTOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 222, at 20.

307.

See id. at 174.

308.

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 293-94.

309.

Id at281-85,293-94.

310.

See infra notes 291-292 and accompanying text.

311.
See Schneider, supra note 108, at 265. "Religion loomed large in the lives of many
families" in Schneider's study of welfare recipients in three cities.ld. at 293.
312.

See CNAAN,supra note 187,at281.
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IV. USING FAITH TO FIGHT POVERTY
Prior to 1996, congregations and other religious groups could not apply
directly for governmental grants to deliver social services.313 Instead, if they
wanted to be considered as grantees, they had to create separate, tax-exempt
affiliates. 314 This system had advantages over charitable choice for all of the
constituents involved in welfare programs. For welfare recipients, there was
less risk for coercion because they usually received services in a secular
atmosphere and were not subject to attempts at religious indoctrination. 315
For its part, the government did not have to spend extensive time and effort
monitoring religious affiliates for potential First Amendment violations. 316
Current and potential employees of religious affiliates were also protected
by the same anti-discrimination laws that governed other employers;317 by
contrast, under charitable choice, grantees can discriminate on the basis of
religion in their employment practices. 3J8 For grantee organizations the prior
system led to fewer worries about government entanglement with religious
practices because the religious and secular components of organizations
were formally separate. 319 Moreover, religious groups were involved in
government contracting prior to charitable choice, and they reported
satisfaction with the church-state balance that had been struck. 320
From a managerial perspective, the creation of a tax-exempt affiliate
also had tangible benefits. Non-profits who apply for tax-exempt status must
create bylaws and articles of incorporation and fill out an application to the
IRS that lists financial resources, potential conflicts of interest, a two-year
budget, and a written narrative essay outlining the organization's existing
and planned programs that will advance the organization's exempt

313. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 3 ("Many faith-based social service organizations
contracted with government long before Charitable Choice and continue to do so.").
314.

See Green, supra note 68, at 36-37.

315.

See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 4; BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 36-

37.
316. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988) ("[T]here is no reason to assume that the
religious organizations which may receive grants are "pervasively sectarian" in the same sense as the
Court has held parochial schools to be. There is accordingly no reason to fear that the less intensive
monitoring involved here will cause the Government to intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of
the religiously affiliated ... grantees.").

317. See Melissa Rogers, Federal Funding and Religion-Based Employment Decisions, in
POLET & RYDEN, supra note 13, at 106-07 (discussing the prohibition on discrimination in
government contracting and under Title VII).
318.

42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000).

319.

Bowen, 478 U.S. at 616.

320. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 40 ("Many faith-based social service
organizations contracted with government long before Charitable Choice and continue to do so.").
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purpose.321 This process provides independence for the board of directors; a
religious group might otherwise be dominated by the wishes of a single
clergyperson. This process also forces the organization to take stock of its
assets, financial and otherwise, and to engage in strategic planning. 322 In
tum, this increases the likelihood of receiving grants and running a
successful program. 323 None of these steps, however, are required for
churches, who are awarded automatic tax-exempt status from the IRS.324
This hands-off approach has historical and legal justifications for churches
that are privately-funded, but churches that spend government money would
be well-served by assessing and improving their internal infrastructure.
Churches can benefit by forming separate affiliates in other ways as well. If
there is a separate affiliate, it is easier to segregate government funds from
church funds and thereby protect a church's financial information from
government scrutiny.325 Separate affiliations also protect the religious
organization from any liabilities incurred by the secular affiliate. 326
For all these reasons, it can be tempting to call for a return to precharitable choice procurement practices. However, this system did not
maximize the social capital offered by congregations, and thus, it missed an
opportunity to better serve welfare recipients. Substantial social science
research confirms that congregations have much to offer to our nation's
welfare system-most congregations have committed volunteers,
connections to other social service organizations, support networks for
members, and the ability and desire to meet discrete, immediate needs in
their communities. 327 The spiritual motivation of congregational members is
valuable, even if congregations do not deliver social services in a uniquely
holistic manner to recipients. Moreover, congregations have the trust of their
geographic communities as well as a moral legitimacy, which no
government bureaucrat can claim. At the same time, congregations are no
substitute for long-standing governmental and non-profit welfare programs.
Congregations generally lack the administrative capacity and/or the desire to

321. See Philip A. Faix, Jr., Organizing a Nonprofit Corporation, in NON-PROFIT
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 469-83 (Victor Futter, ed. 2002) (describing fourteen steps
involved in creating a tax-exempt nonprofit).
322.

[d.

323. ARNOLD J. OLENICK & PHILIP R. OLENICK, A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION OPERATING
MANUAL: PLANNING FOR SURVIVAL AND GROWTH 45--46 (1991) (stating that organizational
planning can "impress funding sources and donors" and "sets a framework for accountability").
324.

LR.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3); LR.C. §§ 508(a), (c)(I)(A).

325. See David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A
Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1353, 1395-96 n.182 (2003).
326.

See id.; OLENICK & OLENICK, supra note 323, at 34--36 (describing the benefits of

incorporating).

327.

See supra Part lILA.
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manage complex government contracts involving tasks such as job training
and drug rehabilitation, which demand personal transformation from welfare
recipients. 328 In a limited pool of funds, providing churches with the
technical support and training needed to run complex programs inevitably
takes away funds from a shrinking pool that could otherwise directly benefit
welfare recipients. 329 Thus, congregations can only play an effective role in
governmental welfare reform programs as long as policymakers are realistic
about what congregations can offer.
Given the variety of congregations in America, the differences in local
welfare systems, and the diversity of welfare recipients, it is difficult to
generalize about how best to channel congregational social capital. In our
highly devolved and decentralized welfare system, the emphasis is on local
solutions to local problems. 33o Nevertheless, there are broad steps that
policymakers can take to involve congregations in welfare systems in an
effective and useful manner. Currently, many congregations link members to
local social service agencies. 331 However, churches often lack adequate
information about resources in their community, and social service agencies
are likewise uninformed about their local congregational resources. 332
Accordingly, government could help foster more formalized, collaborative
networks that would provide education and information to congregations,
local government, and social service agencies about available resources. 333
For instance, government grants could be used to fund positions for
community organizers or congregational staff members who could develop
and maintain these connections over time. Government could also bring
together coalitions of leaders from congregations, social service agencies,
and local government on an ongoing basis to exchange information and to
conduct trainings about available resources both within and without the
community. With better information and long-term collaborative efforts,
social service agencies, both public and private, would better fulfill their
missions and might benefit from donations and volunteer time of church
members. At the same time, churches would better be able to serve the needs
of their members and surrounding communities without sapping their
internal resources and diverting them from their primary mission.

328.

See supra Part II.B.

329. See FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES, supra note 7, at 172-73 (discussing how the lack of
new money will cause resource-shifting from bureaucratic agencies to faith-based organizations).
330. See Steven D. Schwinn, Toward a More Expansive Welfare Devolution Debate, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 3 11, 312- \3 (2005).
331.

See supra note 268 and accompanying text.

332.

See FARNSLEY, supra note 14, at 112-1 \3.

333. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 317-18 (stating that churches are not capable of
delivering social services on a large scale, but government can encourage collaboration among
nonprofits, faith communities, and government).

Fighting Poverty with Faith

437

Governments could also benefit from involving congregations in
welfare planning and evaluation. Congregations have first-hand knowledge
about needs and assets within their communities. They also have the trust of
community members and speak with moral authority. Accordingly,
congregations should be viewed as one of many stakeholders in the welfare
procurement process. By allowing congregations to influence public policies
that affect them, remaining barriers of mistrust can be eased. Moreover, such
an approach could provide opportunities for empowerment that arise as
church members gain valuable skills through public participation.
Congregations could be helpful to policymakers in many ways, such as
assessing community needs, providing input on program goals, gathering
data on the effectiveness of social services, and serving as ombudsmen for
service recipients.
Government can also support congregations in the work they already do
in meeting discrete, immediate needs, such as clothing and food. Additional
funding could support and enhance the existing infrastructure in
congregations that serve these community needs. Not only do congregations
have the capacity to carry out these sorts of services without diminishing
their core mission, but the risks of coercion are also lower in programs that
do not involve long-term, intensive interpersonal counseling. As Justice
Blackmun explained in dissent in the Bowen v. Kendrick case, "The risk of
advancing religion at public expense, and of creating an appearance that the
government is endorsing the medium and the message, is much greater when
the religious organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with the express
intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than where it is neutrally
dispensing medication, food, or shelter."334 Accordingly, governments
should consider focusing charitable choice grants on these latter types of
services. These congregational services are effective not because a religious
approach is better at feeding and clothing the poor, but because
congregations have knowledge of community needs and the experience to
meet discrete requests for assistance as they arise.
In short, this proposal is based on the premise that government should
not directly fund religious groups to deliver complex social services, but
should instead do a better job of collaborating with congregations to better
serve needy Americans and link them with available services. This approach
would maintain the substantial benefits of the pre-charitable choice system
in which religious groups created separate affiliates to deliver social
services, while enhancing that system by providing a meaningful role for
congregations. In low-income communities, churches are often the most
long-standing and influential institutions, and many welfare recipients are
already connected to them. 335 It is a mistake to overlook the social capital
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Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 641 (1988) (B1ackmun, J., dissenting).

335.

See supra Part III.
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these congregations offer, but it is also a mistake to rely on them to deliver
comprehensive social services.

v.

CONCLUSION

Ten years of experience with charitable choice reveals that
congregations lack the administrative capacity to enter long-term
government contracts, that a spiritual approach is not more effective than a
secular one in social service delivery, and that religious organizations are not
adequately accountable to the public, government, or welfare recipients for
the charitable choice funds they receive. Moreover, many religious
organizations that receive charitable choice funds are falling off the
constitutional tightrope that they must balance to comply with the
Establishment Clause. As a result, some of our most vulnerable citizens are
subject to the involuntary indoctrination of religion-a consequence clearly
at odds with the First Amendment.
Despite what we have learned over the last ten years, hundreds of years
of experience suggest that congregations can and should play an integral role
in assisting the needy. In the future, we should acknowledge both the
promise and the perils of bringing religious organizations into the
government contracting fold. Congregations, in particular, are exemplary at
meeting discrete community needs and in collaborating with other
organizations to solve more complex social problems. Instead of pushing
congregations to take on tasks for which they are ill-suited, policyrnakers
should build charitable choice initiatives on the existing strengths offered by
religious groups.

